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Furthermore the union was held to be a proper subject of suit for an-
other purpose in Kisler v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 24 Ohio
L. Rep 144, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 594, on second hearing, 4 Ohio L. Abs.
55 (1925). Thus it would appear that in this state the employer could
maintain an action for damages against the labor union instigating a sit-
down strike.
Under the present status of labor law in Ohio and other jurisdictions,
the sit-down strike is thus an illegal weapon, but the present legal
remedies are ill-suited to meet it. Labor law, however, is constantly
being modified by social forces. It seems possible that public opinion
might, in time, influence the courts and legislatures to such a degree
that they will sanction the use of this new weapon. Whether or not this
occurs it seems probable that the sit-down strike is destined to be a major
weapon in the conflict between labor and industry.
GEORGE BAILEY
LEASES
LEASES - DEFECTIVELY EXECUTED LEASES - EFFECT IN
EQUITY
In 1932, the plaintiff theatre corporation agreed to lease a part of
the defendant's building for a period of about eight years at an annual
rent. A lease was drawn up by the plaintiff in accordance with the
understanding and forwarded to the lessor who failed to have it wit-
nessed. The lessee went into possession and in 1935 surrendered pos-
session at the end of the yearly rental period and brought this action
in which it asked for a declaration that the instrument created only a
tenancy from year to year. The defendant answered and requested
specific performance of the original contract. Held, that such defectively
executed lease may be evidence of a contract to make a lease which
created in favor of the lessor the right of specific performance. R. K. 0.
Distributing Corp. v. Film Center Realty Co., 53 Ohio App. 438,
5 N.E. (2d) 927, 6 Ohio Op. 512, 22 Ohio L. Abs. 402 (1936).
Ohio General Code, Section 851O, provides that a "lease ....
must be signed by the . . . . lessor in the presence of two witnesses,
who shall attest the signing and subscribe their names to the attestation.
Such signing must also be acknowledged by the . . . ., lessor" before
one of certain named officers "who shall certify the acknowledgment on
the same sheet on which the instrument is written or printed, and sub-
scri'e his name thereto." Section 8517 provides that "nothing in this
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chapter contained shall affect the validity of any lease . . . of any
lands for any term not exceeding three years, or require such lease
to be attested, recorded or acknowledged."
The courts of Ohio have consistently held that an instrument pur-
porting to be a lease for a period of three years or more which has not
been executed in compliance with the requirements of Section 8510, is
invalid as a lease and fails in its attempt to create the legal estate or the
term designated in such instrument. Richardson v. Bates, 8 Ohio St.
257 (1858); B. & 0. Co. v. West, 57 Ohio St. 16l, 49 N.E. 344
(1897); Toussaint Shooting Club v. Schwartz, 84 Ohio St. 440, 95
N.E. 1158 (1911).
Though such an instrument does not create the legal estate for the
period designated, it is well established that an implied periodic tenancy
arises when possession is taken and rent paid under the agreement. The
terms of such implied tenancy are those of the instrument except as to
the length of the term. B. & 0. R. Co. v. West, supra; Toussaint
Shooting Club v. Schwartz, supra, The Peoples Building, Loan and
Sazings Co. v. McIntyre; 14 Ohio App. 28 (1921); Weinberg v.
Toledo Corp., 125 Ohio St. 219, 36 Ohio L. Rep. 307, 82 A.L.R.
1315 (1932). The majority of the states in this country have adopted
the English view that a periodic tenancy is a continuing estate and there-
fore notice of termination must be given. In a year-to-year tenancy a six
months notice is necessary while in tenancies for a smaller period, a full
period's notice is required. See Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, Vol. II,
Page 1427; Thompson on Real Property, Sec. 1591. However, Ohio
has taken the position that such implied periodic tenancies are terminable
at the end of any rent period without notice. Gladwell v. Holcomb, 6o
Ohio St. 427, 54 N.E. 473 (1899).
In equity a different effect has been given to such instruments
where the tenant has gone into possession or has done certain acts which
amount to part performance. This court has taken the position that,
under appropriate circumstances, a lease, which has not been executed in
accordance with the requirements of Section 85 IO, will be considered as
a contract to make a lease and specific performance will be granted.
This doctrine has been applied in the following Ohio cases in which such
relief was granted to the parties under defectively executed leases for a
period of more than three years; Raitz v. Dow, io Ohio C. C. (NS)
249, 20 Ohio C.D. 284 (1907); Wheeler v. Mims, 23 Ohio N.P.
(NS) 527, I Ohio L. Abs. 107 (1921); Parsons v. Weinstein, 19
Ohio App. 521, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 648 (1924); Pero v. Miller, 32 Ohio
App. 174, 166 N.E. 242, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 731 (1928) and Anthony
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Carlin Co. v. Burrow Bros., 54 Ohio App. 202 (1936). See Richard-
son v. Bates, 8 Ohio St. 257 (1858), and Lithograph Building Co. v.
Watt, 96 Ohio St. 74, 117 N.E. 25 (1917). Under the Ohio doctrine
of periodic tenancies the estate is terminable at the end of each period.
If it is essential that there be an occupation plus payment of rent in order
to set up the tenancy for the succeeding period, none of the above cases
contain facts which would have given rise to such a tenancy for the
period in controversy. The parties could rely only on their rights in
equity or fail.
In ldams v. Connelly, Io Ohio L. Abs. 121 (193), the court re-
fused to grant specific performance, saying, that to grant such relief
would be to do indirectly that which is forbidden by Section 851o. For
other cases denying equitable relief on other grounds, see, Langmeade
v. Weaver, 65 Ohio St. 17, 6o N.E. 992 (19O1) and Fried v. Cohn-
Goodman, 28 Ohio L. Rep. 91, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 713 (1928). See, also
Peoples Building, Loan & Saving Co. v. McIntyre, 14 Ohio App. 28
(1921).
The English view on this problem is set in the case of Parker v.
Taswell, 2 De. G. & J. 559 (1858). The court was called upon to de-
termine the effect of an unsealed lease under the Real Property Act of
1845, 8 & 9 Vict. C. io6, 53, which provides that a lease "shall be void
at law" unless made by deed. The court took the position that the legis-
lature, in declaring that it shall be void at law, did not intend to inter-
fere with the rights of the parties in equity. This position was affirmed in
Walsh v. Lonsdale, L. R. 21 Ch. D. 9 (1882) with Jessel, M. R.,
stating that since the Judicature act of 1873 the equitable doctrine would
be applied where there was a conflict between law and equity. This
position has been criticised by some English writers. See, Cheshire's
Modern Real Property, 2d ed. Page 135.
The English view has been evidenced either by decision or by way
of dictum in the following cases in this country; Reed v. Moore, 91
Fla. 9oo, io 9 So. 86 (1925); Falck v. Barlow, i1O Md. 159, 72 Ad.
678 (19o9) and Coffman v. Sammons, 76 W. Va. 13, 84 S.E. io61
(1915). One of the most vigorous opinions denying relief is that in
Ballas v. Bank of Harrington, 15 Del. Ch. 140, 132 Ad. 688 (1926),
in which the lessee had taken possession and had expended money in
altering the premises. The court felt that to grant specific performance
would, in effect, destroy the statute.
The present case raises the problem as to how Section 8510 should
be interpreted. What was its purpose? Was it a declaration of the rights
of the parties at law as the English court construed the Real Property
NOTES AND COMMENTS 245
Act to be or was it a declaration of the rights in both equity and law?
To grant specific performance of leases which fail to comply with
statutory requirements tends to lessen the significance of such a statute.
On the other hand there is the possibility of some hardship to a com-
plaining party in situations where the theory of a periodic tenancy is not
available. HOBERT H. BUSH
PARTNERSHIP
MARSHALING - RIGHT OF DEPOSITORS TO COMPETE WITH
INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS IN THE SEPARATE ESTATES OF THE
PARTNERS.
In 191 I a number of persons formed a co-partnership association
for the purpose of engaging in the business of general banking. The
Superintendent of Banks of the state of Ohio took over the bank in 1932
for liquidation and sued the owners of the bank for $5o,ooo alleging
that the assets of the bank were insufficient to pay the liabilities to that
extent. One of the objections made by the defendants to the main-
tenance of the suit was that firm creditors were not entitled to move
against the partners and their non-partnership property until the indi-
vidual creditors of the individual partners had obtained satisfaction of
their claims. The court, in allowing the suit, granted the correctness of
the general equitable rule contended for but said that the rule had
been modified as to the depositors in and owners of unincorporated
banks by the provisions of Section 71o-8o, General Code, and that
depositors could share in the separate assets of the partners on an equal
footing with the individual creditors. State v. Steck, 132 Ohio St. 198,
9 Ohio Bar 42, 5 N.E. (2d) 919, (1936).
Section 71o-8o reads as follows: "The depositors in any unin-
corporated bank shall have first lien on the assets of such bank, in case
it is wound up, to the extent of their several deposits, and for any
balance remaining unpaid, such depositors shall share in the general
assets of the owner or owners alike with the general creditors." De-
fendants' argument must have been that "general creditors" meant
"general creditors of the firm." Only one case had previously con-
strued this part of the section. The probate judge of Madison County
in the case of In re Johnson, 3 Ohio Op. 540 (1935), held that
"general creditors" meant "general creditors of the owner or owners."
He stated, however, that the result would be the same if the words
meant "general creditors of the firm." If the depositors, who have
